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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
estoppel doctrine presents some difficulty, as the underlying
theory of estoppel is that a man is estopped from denying his
prior position to the detriment of another.2 2 In this case it would
mean that X was estopped from denying that his compensation
insurance covered defendant's employees. This, of course, would
not bind the insurer, and since X never represented that he was
subjecting himself to personal liability, so that he could be
estopped from so denying, X would seem not to be liable under
estoppel. However, had defendant argued misrepresentation, it
would seem that a cause of action had been stated. Therefore, it
is submitted that misrepresentation would have been a more
satisfactory basis for the instant decision, in view of the fact
that "estoppels are not favored in law ' '2 3 and are supposed to be
used only when there is no other means of affording justice.2 4
Ray Carlton Muirhead
TORTS - MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
The widow of deceased sued defendant municipality for the
wrongful death of her helplessly intoxicated husband who suffo-
cated from smoke after being locked in jail and left alone. The
trial court denied recovery by applying the doctrine of municipal
tort immunity. On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, held,
reversed. A municipality has no immunity from liability in a
tort action when a person suffers a direct personal injury proxi-
mately caused by the negligence of a municipal employee who is
acting within the scope of his employment. However, the im-
munity still exists in legislative and judicial functions.' Har-
grove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
The general rule is that municipalities are immune from
22. "'Estoppe' cometh of the French word estoupe, from whence the English
word stopped; and it is called an estoppel, or conclusion, because a man's own
act or acceptance, stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to alleage or plead the truth."
CoKE'S INSTITUTES 352a. See Reynolds v. St. John's Grand Lodge, A.F. & A.M.,
171 La. 395, 131 So. 186 (1930) ; Lewis v. King, 157 La. 718, 103 So. 19 (1925) ;
Patorno v. Villio, 9 Orl. App. 104 (1912) ; Lichtentag v. Feitel, 1 Orl. App. 172
(La. App. 1904) ; PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 529-30 (2d ed. 1955).
23. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Thompson, 222 La. 868, 64 So.2d 202
(1952) ; Carpenter v. Madden, 90 So.2d 508, 514 (La. App. 1956).
24. Estoppel is an equitable remedy. Glover v. Southern Cities Distributing
Co., 142 So. 289 (La. App. 1932). Therefore estoppel must bow to the equitable
rule that a complete and adequate legal remedy excludes equitable remedies.
Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U.S. 119 (1892).
1. The judiciary and the legislature have always been accorded immunity from
tort liability because of the desire to preserve their independence. See PROSSER,
LAw OF TORTS 780, § 109 (2d ed. 1955).
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liability for torts resulting from the exercise of governmental
functions, 2 but are liable for torts arising out of proprietary
functions.3 This rule of liability or immunity based on the ac-
tivity involved was first introduced into the American common
law in 1842 by the New York court in the case of Bailey v. New
York. 4 The immunity apparently grew out of the English prem-
ise that the sovereign can do no wrong, but since its inception
the courts have advanced other reasons to justify the immunity.5
The policy of allowing or denying municipal liability on the
basis of the function involved has produced inconsistent6 and in
many cases unjust 7 results. The courts have restricted the im-
2. McSheridan v. Talladega, 243 Ala. 162, 8 So.2d 831 (1942) ; Kelly v. Chi-
cago, 324 Ill. App. 382, 58 N.E.2d 278 (1944) ; Tzatken v. Detroit, 226 Mich. 603,
198 N.W. 214 (1924) ; Gullikson v. McDonald, 62 Minn. 278, 64 N.W. 812 (1895).
3. Pignet v. Santa Monica, 29 Cal. App.2d 286, 84 P.2d 166 (1938) ; Karsey
v. San Francisco, 130 Cal. App. 655, 20 P.2d 751 (1933) ; Peavey v. Miami, 146
Fla. 629, 1 So.2d 614 (1941) ; Bathke v. Traverse City, 308 Mich. 1, 13 N.W.2d
184 (1944) ; Brantman v. Canby, 119 Minn. 396, 138 N.W. 671 (1912) ; Burton
v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 Pac. 443 (1926) ; Richmond v. James, 170
Va. 553, 197 S.E. 416 (1938).
4. 3 Hill 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (N.Y. 1842).
5. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 774, § 109 (2d ed. 1955). These reasons are
that the municipality derives no profit from the exercise of governmental func-
tions, that in the performance of such duties public officers are agents of the state
and not of the corporation, that cities cannot carry on their governmental ac-
tivities if money is to be diverted to making good the torts of employees, and that
it is unreasonable to hold the municipality liable for negligence in the perform-
ance of duties imposed upon it by the Legislature. See also Doddridge, Distinction
Between Governmental and Proprietary Functions of the Government, 23 MICH.
L. REV. 325, 337 (1925), where it is stated that in addition to the technical idea
that the sovereign is immune from tort liability the following reasons also have
been advanced - that it is better for the individual to suffer than for the public
as a whole to suffer and that such liability would retard agents of the municipality
in the performance of their duties. It should be noted that these authorities are
merely listing reasons advanced by the courts, not expressing approval of those
reasons.
6. See Doddridge, Distinction Between Governmental and Proprietary Func-
tions of the Government, 23 MICH. L. REv. 325 (1925). See also a collection of
cases in Note, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 812, 814, n. 6 (1956) with exactly the
opposite holding as to whether a particular activity is governmental or proprietary.
The South Carolina courts, noting the confusion produced by the governmental
and proprietary distinction, apply the immunity in all cases regardless of the func-
tion involved, except where the Legislature has expressly imposed liability. Irvine
v. Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911).
7. The respondeat superior doctrine is based on the public policy of allowing
recovery from the master who is more likely to have the means with which to
satisfy a judgment than the servant would have. See MECHEM, OUTLINES OF Tim
LAW OF AGENCY § 352 (4th ed. 1952) : "[S]ince the principal or master is likely
to be of greater financial responsibility than the agent or servant . . . and since
public policy demands that injuries shall not go uncompensated, the best results
are promoted by giving a remedy against the principal." It is difficult to reconcile
the municipal immunity with this concept of liability of the master. It is equally
difficult to see how justice is achieved when recovery is allowed for an injury
sustained by the negligent operation of a city-owned streetcar, Young v. New
Orleans, 14 Lit. App. 306 (1930), and denied when the injury results from the
negligent operation of a fire truck, Brock-Hall Dairy Co. v. New Haven, 122 Conn.
321, 189 Atl. 182 (1937). At least from the point of view of the injured party, it
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munity by devising exceptions rather than by discarding it en-
tirely. Liability may be imposed under one such exception when
the municipality is found to have maintained a nuisance.8 Fur-
ther, some jurisdictions regard the purchase of liability insur-
ance as a waiver of immunity,9 although one court has held that
the purchase of liability insurance does not produce a waiver
where governmental functions are involved. 10 Several states
have attempted to remove the immunity in certain areas of mu-
nicipal activity by statute, but these efforts have met with lim-
ited success primarily because the courts of those states have
insisted on construing the statutes strictly as being in derogation
of the common law."
Louisiana subscribes to the general rule of immunity for gov-
ernmental functions 12 and liability for proprietary functions.'8
In Louisiana the immunity is personal to the municipality. 4
Therefore, if the municipality has purchased liability insurance,
the injured party may proceed directly against the insurer who
would seem that it matters little whether the vehicle involved was a streetcar or
a fire truck.
8. Hoffman v. Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 155 Atl. 499 (1931); Valparaiso v.
Moffit, 12 Ind. App. 250, 39 N.E. 909 (1895) ; Hines v. Rocky Mount, 162 N.C.
409, 78 S.E. 510 (1913) ; Fort Worth v. Wiggins, 5 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1928).
9. Tracy v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Ill. 1954); Bailey v. Knoxville,
113 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. Tenn. 1953) ; Thomas v. School Dist., 348 Ill. App. 567,
109 N.E.2d 636 (1952).
10. Stephenson v. Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.E.2d 195 (1950).
11. See Antieau, Statutory Expansion of Municipal Tort Liability, 4 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 351 (1957) for a review of statutory changes in the United States and the
subsequent application of them by the courts. "Courts are not only reluctant to
remedy the situation themselves, they have also overwhelmingly refused to recog-
nize legislative rectification in any but the most obvious and unavoidable situa-
tions." Id. at 354.
12. See Fordham & Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort in Louisi-
ana, 3 LouISIANA LAW REvIEw 720 (1941), for an analysis of the use of the
immunity doctrine in Louisiana and a criticism of the rule. The distinction be-
tween governmental and proprietary functions was first used in Stewart v. New
Orleans, 9 La. Ann. 461 (1854), but it did not receive the approval of a majority
of the court (2 judges approving the distinction, 1 concurring for other reasons,
2 dissenting). It was adopted by a majority in Lewis v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann.
190 (1857) and has since been regarded as the rule in Louisiana. Cases illus-
trative of governmental functions: Barber Laboratories v. New Orleans, 227 La.
104, 78 So.2d 525 (1955), criticized by The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court
for the 1954-1955 Term- Local Government, 16 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW 308,
316 (1956) (negligence by members of fire department while fighting fire);
Howard v. New Orleans, 159 La. 443, 105 So. 443 (1925) (negligent operation
of elevator in municipal building) ; Roach v. Shreveport, 8 La. App. 339 (1928)
(police officers wrongfully disposing of automobile removed from street).
* 13. Oliphant v. Lake Providence, 193 La. 675, 192 So. 95 (1939) ; Young v.
New Orleans, 14 La. App. 306, 129 So. 247 (1930) ; Phillips v. Alexandria, 11 La.
App. 228, 123 So. 510 (1929); Mask v. Monroe, 9 La. App. 431, 121 So. 250
.(1928) ; Hart v. Lake Providence, 5 La. App. 294 (1927) ; Bannister v. Monroe,
4 La. App. 182 (1926).14. Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 169 So. 132 (La. App. 1936).
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cannot interpose the immunity. 15 In Buris v. New Orleans'8 it
appeared that the Louisiana court was going to restrict the im-
munity further by broadening the nuisance exception to permit
liability where the municipality was found to have maintained
an attractive nuisance. However, on the second appeal of the
case the court reversed its position and applied the immunity,
although not conclusively rejecting the contention that under
some circumstances an attractive nuisance might be an excep-
tion to the immunity rule. 1 7 Legal scholars have been critical of
the rule based on the governmental-proprietary doctrine in that
it is basically unreal and judicially unworkable.'8 No test ad-
vanced thus far has been consistently workable in determining
whether a function is governmental or proprietary. 19 Some
courts have been cognizant of the need for a change, but con-
tend that the immunity is embodied in the common law and that
any change must originate with the legislature.20  Most legal
writers are agreed that, since the courts have refused to act, it
is indeed necessary for the legislatures to make the change.21
15. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950).
16. Burris v. New Orleans, 86 So.2d 549, 555 (La. App. 1956), 17 LOUISIANA
LAW REvIEw 498 (1957) : "[W]e conclude that possibly there may be circum-
stances under which the doctrine [attractive nuisance] should be applied even
where a municipality is engaged in the performance of a governmental function."
The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether such
circumstances existed.
17. Burris v. New Orleans, 100 So.2d 550, 551 (La. App. 1958) : "The only
question now posed is one of law . . . that is whether under the facts of this
case the doctrine of attractive nuisance constitutes an exception to the general
rule that a municipality while engaged in a governmental function is immune from
tort liability." The court went on to conclude that the doctrine did not constitute
an exception "under the facts of this case." Id. at 552.
18. See Antieau, The Tort Liability of American Municipalities, 40 Ky. L.J.
131 (1952) ; Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 129 (1924) ;
Green, Freedom of Litigation (III), Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL. L. REV.
355 (1944) ; Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MIcH. L. REV. 41 (1949).
19. See Comment, 1 BROOKLYN L. REV. 85, 88 (1932), .and cases cited therein.
These tests of governmental function are set forth: (1) when it performs a duty
imposed by the Legislature of the state, (2) only when such imposed duty is one
the state may perform and which pertains to the administration of the govern-
ment, (3) when the municipality acts for the public benefit generally as dis-
tinguished from acting for its immediate benefit and its private good, (4) when
the act performed is legislative or discretionary as distinguished from ministerial.
20. Singleton v. Sumter, 180 S.C. 536, 542, 186 S.E. 535, 537 (1936) : "We
deem it not improper to call to the attention of the legislature the need of addi-
tional legislation if it desires to protect individuals in their person and property
against employees of municipalities negligently operating dangerous instrumental-
ities." See also Orgeron v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 19 La. App. 628, 140
So. 282 (1932); Reeves v. City of Easley, 167 S.C. 231, 166 S.E. 120 (1932) ;
Moore v. Milwaukee, 267 Wis. 166, 65 N.W.2d 3 (1954). And yet, where the
Legislature has acted, the courts have limited the resulting liability by strict inter-
pretation of the statutes. See note 11 supra.
21. Antieau, Statutory Expansion of Municipal Tort Liability, 4 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 129 (1957) ; Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 129
(1924) ; Fordham & Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort in Louisi-
19581
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However, one critic of the immunity and the Florida court in
the instant case have declared that it is the responsibility of the
courts to make the correction.2
Prior to the instant case, the Florida courts had judicially
restricted the immunity further than most jurisdictions by evi-
dencing a tendency to find municipal activities to be proprietary
rather than governmental. 28  Nevertheless, the immunity was
consistently applied in the case of torts of police officers.24 In
deciding the instant case the court squarely faced the arguments
historically advanced to justify the immunity and rejected
them.25 Florida is now in the unique position of having judicial-
ly eliminated the immunity based on the governmental-propri-
etary doctrine. In so doing, the court specifically stated that the
immunity still exists in situations involving legislative and ju-
dicial functions.2 6 In rejecting the immunity doctrine the court
reasoned that they were not disregarding the doctrine of stare
decisis but were merely returning to earlier and wiser jurispru-
dence which denied immunity.2 7 Since the early Louisiana cases
allowed no immunity,28 it is suggested that the Louisiana courts
could also reason that to reject the immunity is merely a return
to earlier jurisprudence. However, only two years before the in-
stant case the Louisiana Supreme Court was specifically asked
ana, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 720 (1941) ; Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48
MIcH. L. REV. 41 (1949) ; Tooke, The Eoten8ion of Municipal Liability in Tort,
19 VA. L. REv. 97 (1932).
22. Green, Freedom of Litigation (III), Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL.
L. REv. 355, 382 (1944) : "All that is required to get rid of the immunities now
protecting municipalities from their just responsibilities is a moderate amount of
common law statesmanship on the bench .... It is not the legislature's problem."
The court in the instant case, 96 So.2d at 132, said: "We can see no necessity for
insisting on legislative action in a matter which the courts themselves originated."
23. Wolfe v. Miami, 103 Fla. 774, 134 So. 539 (1931) ; Tallahassee v. Kauf-
man, 87 Fla. 119, 100 So. 150 (1924).
24. Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1953) ; Brownlee v. Orlando, 157 Fla.
524, 26 So.2d 504 (1946); Kennedy v. Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 675, 182 So.
228 (1938).
25. The court adopted the view of the dissents in Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d
24 (Fla. 1953) and William v. Green Cove Springs, 65 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1953) as
a thorough and lucid explanation of their justification for the departure from the
immunity rule.
26. The court cited Elrod v. Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 24, 180 So. 378 (1938)
(unconstitutional, discriminatory ordinance, immunity applies) and Akin t.
Miami, 65 So.2d 54 (Fla. 1953) (city official withholding building permit, ap-
parently without justification, immunity applied) as illustrative of legislative,
quasi-legislative, judicial, and quasi-judicial functions.
27. Tallahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19, 52 Am. Dec. 358 (1850).
28. Johnson v. Municipality No. One, 5 La. Ann. 100 (1850) : "The liability
of municipal corporations for the acts of their agents is a general rule of law too
well settled to be seriously questioned." See also M'Gary v. Lafayette, 12 Rob.
668 (La. 1846) ; Lambeth v. Mayor, 6 La. 731 (1834) ; Mayor v. Peyroux, 8
Mart.(N.S.) 155 (La. 1827).
NOTES
to reverse its present position of applying the immunity in gov-
ernmental functions and refused to do so. 29
Since the courts originally announced the immunity based on
the governmental-proprietary distinction, there is no reason why
they should not act to eliminate it. On the other hand, if the
immunity were to be judicially eliminated, the municipalities
would be immediately exposed to extensive liability. This fact
gives rise to the argument that the legislatures should follow the
lead of the federal government by enacting laws similar to the
Federal Tort Claims Act and thus impose general liability °
while preserving the immunity in certain functions."' This pos-
sibility lends some force to the argument that the legislatures
should take the responsibility of imposing tort liability on the
municipalities. However, it is submitted that there is no longer
any need to provide municipalities any protection from tort lia-
bility, and that the correction should be made by the courts who
are responsible for the rule.
J. C. Parkerson
29. Barber Laboratories, Inc. v. New Orleans, 227 La. 104, 78 So.2d 525(1955).
30. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952).
31. Id. § 2680.
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